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Introduction	
	
In	2011	and	2012,	“the	payment	ring”	(betalingsring	in	Danish)	became	the	popular	term	for	a	
policy	proposal	to	charge	drivers	a	fee	every	time	they	passed	in	or	out	of	Copenhagen’s	city	
centre.	The	plans	were	not	particularly	new	given	how	other	European	cities	like	Oslo,	
Stockholm	and	London	were	already	operating	similar	payment	zones	or	congestion	charge	
systems	in	order	to	reduce	traffic	levels.	However,	the	Copenhagen	payment	ring	and	its	
rather	spectacular	failure	is	useful	as	a	case	of	what	happens	when	new	sociotechnical	
infrastructures	are	configured	in	financial	terms	based	on	a	set	of	specific	economic	
assumptions.		
	
The	policy	framework	in	which	the	payment	ring	plans	arose	was	informed	by	neoclassical	
economics.	Such	a	frame,	I	argue,	was	not	equipped	to	handle	the	multifaceted	controversy	
that	came	to	surround	the	payment	ring	proposal.	In	the	field	of	science	and	technology	
studies,	however,	scholars	argue	that	the	introduction	of	new	sociotechnical	devices	must	
always	be	expected	to	spark	controversy.	As	Latour	puts	it,	for	any	new	technological	
solution,	”the	price	to	pay	is	an	innovation”	(Latour,	1996,	p.31).	Innovation	here	means	that	
”the	numbers	of	actors	that	have	to	be	taken	into	account	is	not	a	given	from	the	outset”	
(Latour,	1996,	p.72).	In	other	words,	the	introduction	of	a	new	object	into	collective	life	will	
require	the	reconfiguration	of	existing	worlds,	which	is	likely	to	involve	new	alliances,	shifts	
in	power,	and	controversy	(see	also	Latour,	2003,	2005).	
	
The	Copenhagen	payment	ring	was	no	exception	in	this	regard.	The	popular	narrative	today	is	
that	its	intertwinement	with	the	Danish	national	elections	of	2011	made	the	payment	ring	a	
political	hot	potato	so	controversial	that	it	could	not	be	instituted.	In	this	article,	I	argue	the	
opposite.	The	Copenhagen	payment	ring	was	never	realized	because	it	was,	in	a	Latourian	
sense,	never	made	controversial	enough.	The	argument	involves	a	reorientation	towards	a	
more	positive	understanding	of	controversy.		
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I	follow	Latour’s	(1996)	conclusion	from	his	study	of	the	failed	ARAMIS	transport	system	in	
Paris.	For	a	new	socio-technical	system	to	be	actualized,	it	requires	that	actors	of	sufficient	
strength	and	numbers	support	it	so	much	that	they	carry	it	through	the	inevitable	
controversies,	which	means	doing	the	hard	work	of	making	the	necessary	amendments	and	
compromises.	For	purposes	of	clarification,	I	use	the	notion	of	”issues”	to	refer	to	this	positive	
understanding	of	controversy	as	an	inevitable	part	of	object-oriented	politics	(Marres,	2007),	
thus	leaving	”controversy”	to	refer	to	the	more	common-sensical	meaning	of	a	political	drama	
often	played	out	in	the	media.	
	
How	we	can	come	to	understand	why	the	city	of	Copenhagen	to	this	day	does	not	have	any	
kind	of	road	pricing	or	congestion	charge	system	in	place	despite	its	much-advertised	
commitment	to	environmental	causes	and	the	fact	that	‘neighboring’	cities	already	have	such	
systems	in	place?	My	argument	is	that	when	the	issue	finally	emerged	on	the	center	stage	of	
Danish	politics,	backed	by	a	seemingly	strong	political	alliance,	the	policy	was	understood	
primarily	in	economic	terms,	something	which	prevented	the	proposed	new	infrastructure	
from	unfolding	as	a	sociotechnical	issue.	The	payment	ring	controversy	is	thus	an	instructive	
case	of	how	economic	assumptions,	including	in	this	case	financial	concerns,	configure	and	to	
some	extent	obstruct	the	politics	of	sociotechnical	systems.		
	
In	order	to	unpack	how	this	happened,	I	first	go	back	to	the	years	before	the	election	in	2011	
and	specify	how	economic	assumptions	shaped	the	idea	of	building	a	payment	ring	from	the	
outset.	Then	I	revisit	the	media	controversy	of	2011-2012	that	built	up	to	the	decision	to	drop	
the	payment	ring.	Finally,	I	illustrate	how	the	politicians	in	charge	stuck	with	their	economic	
assumptions	and	missed	the	opportunity	to	renegotiate	how	a	payment	ring	could	be	made	
part	of	life	in	Copenhagen.	In	other	words,	they	missed	the	chance	to	treat	it	as	an	issue.	
	
Demonstrating	financial	responsibility	
	
The	payment	ring	came	onto	the	Danish	political	agenda	through	the	specific	setting	of	an	
alliance	between	the	Social	Democrats	(S)	and	the	Socialist	People’s	Party	(SF).	The	formation	
of	the	S-SF	alliance	was	part	of	the	attempt	to	overthrow	a	right-wing	government	that	had	
been	in	power	in	Denmark	for	a	decade.	The	idea	was	that	in	order	to	achieve	this,	a	feasible	
alternative	would	have	to	be	carefully	and	consistently	demonstrated	well	in	advance	of	the	
national	elections.	Among	other	things,	this	included	trying	to	make	SF	part	of	a	coalition	
government	for	the	first	time	in	the	party’s	history.	SF	was	not	just	a	more	left-leaning	partner	
than	the	Social	Democrats	had	been	used	to	historically	when	forming	coalition	governments,	
it	was	also	an	explicitly	“green”	party.	Accordingly,	it	was	through	SF	that	the	idea	of	a	
payment	ring	around	Copenhagen	was	brought	to	the	forefront	of	national	politics.	
 
The	payment	ring	was	first	presented	in	a	series	of	common	political	programs,	serving	to	
bolster	the	S-SF	alliance	in	the	lead-up	to	the	national	elections	of	2011.	The	first	publication,	
“Fair	Change,”	was	published	in	2009.	The	second	and	expanded	version	called	“Fair	Solution”	
came	out	in	2010.	The	final	program,	“Fair	Solution	2020,”	was	published	in	May	2011,	with	
the	elections	taking	place	in	September	that	same	year	(S-SF,	2009,	2010,	2011).	The	general	
aim	of	these	documents	was	to	present	a	set	of	economic	reforms	that	a	new	S-SF	government	
would	introduce	if	elected.		
	
The	overarching	concern	was	to	show	financial	responsibility	in	order	to	push	back	against	
oft-repeated	claims	that	a	center-left	government	would	inevitably	lead	to	increased	
government	spending,	followed	by	a	destabilization	of	the	state	finances.	The	need	to	counter	
such	claims	could	be	seen	as	especially	high	due	to	the	proposed	inclusion	of	a	left-wing	party	
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like	SF	in	the	proposed	coalition	government.	The	means	to	achieve	an	image	of	financial	
responsibility,	it	was	believed,	was	to	forge	a	reform	program	that	would	not	incur	an	overall	
increase	in	state	expenditure.	The	purpose	of	the	series	of	policy	documents	was	to	outline	
such	a	program,	and	the	payment	ring	was	introduced	as	a	part	of	these	efforts.	
 
The	problem	of	showing	political	agency	and	financial	responsibility	at	the	same	time	thus	
overshadowed	the	problem	of	how	to	introduce	the	payment	ring	to	the	Danish	electorate.	To	
quote	my	interview	with	one	of	the	politicians	that	took	part	in	the	process,	the	aim	of	the	
common	policy	documents	was	to	demonstrate	that	there	existed	“a	clear	alternative	to	the	
sitting	government”	(Birkbak,	2016).	Indeed,	the	series	of	“Fair”	documents	presented	a	set	of	
reforms	that	were	supposed	to	make	Denmark	a	better	place	to	live	while	also	being	self-
financing.	Taxes	would	not	increase;	instead,	they	would	be	distributed	more	intelligently	(S-
SF,	2011).		
 
In	this	policy	setting,	the	payment	ring	was	not	treated	as	a	potentially	contentious	public	
issue.	It	was	not	even	treated	as	an	issue	in	the	smaller	political	arena	of	the	internal	S-SF	
negotiations,	according	to	my	informant	(Birkbak,	2016).	After	brief	discussions	in	2009,	the	
parties	simply	agreed	to	treat	the	payment	ring	as	a	source	of	income	in	their	much	larger	
reform	package.	As	a	result,	the	political	programs	dedicated	only	a	couple	lines	of	text	to	the	
payment	ring,	focusing	on	how	it	would	generate	an	estimated	annual	income	of	2	billion	DKK	
that	could	then	be	spent	on	more	environmentally	friendly	transportation	systems.		
	
Figure	1:	“Betalingsring	om	København”	(Danish	for	“payment	ring	around	Copenhagen”)	
figures	in	the	policy	plan	as	raising	2	billion	DKK	(around	€270	million)	for	“green”	traffic	
solutions	(S-SF	2011) 
 
	
 
Source:	Page	40	of	the	document	Fair	Løsning	2020,	published	in	2011	as	a	platform	for	the	
collaboration	between	S-SF,	retrievable	on:	
http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/htm/baggrund/generel/s-planen.pdf	
	
While	part	of	efforts	to	make	Copenhagen	“greener”,	the	payment	ring	was	also	claimed	to	be	
an	example	of	a	more	intelligent	way	of	running	the	Danish	economy.	Aside	from	generating	
an	income,	it	would	simultaneously	make	Copenhagen	greener,	safer,	and	more	efficient.	As	
such,	the	policy	can	be	understood	in	relation	to	a	more	general	shift	in	environmental	policy	
towards	a	regime	of	“ecological	modernization,”	where	economics	becomes	the	key	discipline	
with	which	the	environment	is	known	and	acted	on	by	politicians	(Blok,	2007).	In	this	
perspective,	the	payment	ring	was	part	of	a	larger	shift	towards	a	political	primacy	of	
economics	and	economic	assumptions	as	the	means	with	which	to	deal	with	a	wide	range	of	
themes.	
 
The	idea	that	a	payment	ring	could	be	part	of	a	regime	of	ecological	modernization,	where	
economics	play	the	central	role,	preceded	the	S-SF	alliance.	At	least	since	1990,	a	payment	
ring	had	been	understood	as	a	potential	solution	to	the	issue	of	automotive	congestion	in	
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Copenhagen	(Jensen,	1990),	and	it	was	seen	as	a	particularly	attractive	solution	because	it	
would	generate	considerable	income	for	the	state	and/or	the	municipality.	This	income	was	
the	key	concern	when	the	state-funded	Danish	Economic	Councils	(DEC)	mentioned	the	idea	
of	a	Copenhagen	payment	ring	in	their	2006	annual	report	on	the	Danish	economy.	As	DEC	
saw	it,	any	solution	to	congestion	would	have	to	deal	with	the	fact	that	reducing	traffic	could	
be	a	costly	affair	for	the	Danish	economy.	Heavy	traffic	was	understood	to	be	closely	tied	to	a	
prosperous	national	economy,	thus	presenting	a	dilemma.	In	the	words	of	the	DEC	report:	 
 
Traffic	increases	with	economic	growth.	Traffic	has	both	advantages	and	
disadvantages.	We	are	happy	when	we	can	transport	ourselves	fast	and	easy	to	
pastime	activities,	and	transport	is	an	indispensable	part	of	the	production	in	a	
modern	society.	But	at	the	same	time,	increasing	traffic	does	result	in	more	
pollution,	noise,	accidents	and	congestion	–	it	is	called	externalities.	There	are	
thus	two	opposing	concerns	that	must	be	balanced.	(Sørensen,	Skaksen,	and	
Rosholm,	2006,	translated	from	Danish	by	the	author) 
 
Congestion	is	here	understood	in	economic	terms	as	a	necessary	evil	(‘externality')	in	any	
healthy	modern	economy,	and	as	a	result	any	attempts	at	reducing	traffic	must	be	considered	
a	financially	risky	business	for	the	state.	DEC	was	clear	about	its	focus:	“Our	analyses	indicate	
that	the	general	economic	effects	are	of	outmost	importance”	(ibid.).	In	order	to	determine	
how	best	to	design	a	system	of	road	charges	that	would	be	economically	sound,	DEC	ran	an	
economic	model	called	ASTRA	(Pilegaard,	Bjørner,	and	Hauch,	2006),	whose	primary	
emphasis	was	not	congestion	or	pollution,	but	the	amount	of	labor	available	in	the	Danish	
labor	market	(Sørensen	et	al.	2006).	The	introduction	of	congestion	charges,	the	economists	
argued,	was	likely	to	decrease	labor	availability	by	making	it	more	expensive	to	get	to	work.	
However,	the	model	showed	that	this	could	be	compensated	for	by	using	the	revenue	from	the	
payment	ring	to	lower	income	taxes,	which	would	then	increase	the	amount	of	available	labor	
by	making	it	more	attractive	to	work.	DEC	emphasized	that	they	recommended	spending	the	
revenue	this	way	and	not	elsewhere,	for	example	on	improved	public	transport.	 
 
Having	solved	the	problem	in	economic	terms,	DEC	concluded	that	it	was	only	a	question	of	
when	and	how	to	build	a	payment	ring,	not	whether	to	build	it	at	all.	They	did	note	that	there	
were	several	approaches	to	modeling	the	economic	effects	of	road	charges	and	recommended	
that	more	research	be	conducted	before	a	specific	plan	could	be	produced.	But	this	was	
regarded	a	question	of	using	further	technical	economic	expertise	to	fine-tune	the	modelling,	
and	was	not	expected	to	call	the	desirability	of	a	payment	ring	into	question.		
	
Other	expert	bodies	argued	for	a	payment	ring	based	on	different	arguments	and	with	
somewhat	different	recommendations	(Wrang,	Nielsen,	and	Kohl,	2006),	but	in	general	there	
was	no	heated	controversy	about	the	payment	ring	in	the	Danish	policy	expert	setting.	It	was	
understood	as	an	economic	problem	to	be	solved.	The	question	of	how	to	conceive	and	build	
the	necessary	infrastructure	in	engineering	terms	appears	to	have	been	even	less	open	for	
critical	scrutiny.	There	was	also	consensus	across	the	two	main	blocks	in	Danish	party	
politics.	News	coverage	shows	that	back	in	2008,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	recommended	a	
payment	ring	as	the	“only	solution”	to	the	problems	of	congestion	and	pollution	in	
Copenhagen,	even	though	a	right-wing	coalition	(the	main	opponents	of	S-SF)	held	
governmental	power	at	the	time	(Gräs,	2011).		
	
The	S-SF	documents	did	not	follow	DEC’s	recommendation	that	the	income	from	a	payment	
ring	should	be	spent	on	lower	income	taxes,	which	is	part	of	the	explanation	why	their	plans	
came	to	be	seen	as	controversial.	But	the	S-SF	plans	nonetheless	drew	on	a	couple	of	decades	
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of	thinking	about	a	payment	ring	in	terms	of	economic	policy,	which	goes	some	way	in	
explaining	how	it	came	onto	the	public	agenda	not	so	much	as	a	complicated	infrastructure	
but	as	a	financial	instrument.	Keeping	in	mind	Latour’s	argument	that	any	innovation	involves	
the	proliferation	of	new	actors,	the	lack	of	other-than-economic	considerations	about	
instituting	a	payment	zone	in	Copenhagen	suggests	that	the	next	step	would	be	a	controversy.	
But	from	the	perspective	of	neoclassical	economic	assumptions	just	described,	it	came	as	a	
surprise,	something	I	will	try	to	explain	after	having	revisited	the	controversy.	
	
A	ring	of	fire:	The	media	controversy	
	
In	the	months	before	and	after	the	2011	national	elections	(which	did	bring	the	S-SF	alliance	
into	power),	the	payment	ring	consensus	vanished.	This	was	not	least	due	to	a	shift	of	setting.	
The	payment	ring	suddenly	became	a	hot	topic	in	the	media	after	years	of	relative	quiet.	In	
2011	and	2012,	the	topic	was	mentioned	almost	1000	times	each	year	in	the	national	news	
media.	In	all	other	years	since	1990,	the	word	was	used	in	less	than	100	articles	per	year,	
except	for	2013	where	some	interest	still	lingered,	resulting	in	190	mentions	(Infomedia,	
2015).	
 
The	publicity	around	the	payment	ring	was	driven	both	by	how	the	S-SF	coalition	tried	to	
leverage	it	in	advance	of	the	elections	to	gain	momentum,	and	by	how	their	political	
opponents	tried	to	expose	it	as	a	mistaken	idea	in	order	to	weaken	the	S-SF	bid	for	power.	For	
example,	two	of	the	mayors	of	Copenhagen	(representing	S	and	SF,	respectively)	advocated	
for	a	payment	ring	by	elaborating	on	the	existing	negative	consequences	of	congestion	and	
the	future	positive	consequences	of	a	payment	ring	(Jensen	and	Kjeldgaard,	2011).		
	
The	discussion	still	centered	on	economics,	but	the	argument	was	not	the	same	as	DEC	had	
made	years	before.	According	to	the	mayors,	it	had	been	calculated	that	current	congestion	
levels	came	at	a	price	of	around	10	billion	DKK	annually	in	terms	of	lost	productivity	in	the	
Danish	economy	due	to	the	time	wasted	in	traffic.	A	payment	ring	would	lower	the	congestion	
level	by	more	than	20	per	cent,	meaning	that	less	money	would	be	lost	to	congestion.	On	top	
of	that,	a	payment	ring	would	generate	2	billion	DKK	annually	that	could	then	be	spent	on	
improving	public	transportation	without	having	to	increase	other	taxes.		
 
Compared	to	the	DEC	argument,	where	the	revenue	would	have	to	be	used	to	lower	income	
taxes	in	order	to	compensate	for	an	assumed	economic	cooling	effect,	the	S-SF	politicians	
assumed	that	the	payment	ring	was	self-financing	due	to	a	more	efficient	transport	flow,	
which	again	meant	that	the	2	billion	DKK	revenue	figure	was	free	to	be	used	elsewhere.	As	a	
result,	the	S-SF	politicians	were	able	to	claim	that	a	“payment	ring	will	benefit	everyone,”	to	
quote	the	heading	of	their	letter	to	the	editor,	printed	in	the	Danish	daily	Politiken.	As	
mentioned,	the	common	political	programs	of	the	S-SF	coalition	cast	the	payment	ring	as	
primarily	a	source	of	income	in	a	much	larger	reform	package.	In	the	media	setting,	the	
payment	ring	was	placed	at	the	center	of	attention	and	referred	to	as	an	initiative	that	could	
stand	on	its	own.		
 
These	pro-payment	ring	arguments	were	not	left	unchallenged	for	long.	Three	days	after	the	
S-SF	text,	another	letter	to	the	editor	was	published	in	Politiken	arguing	that	a	payment	ring	
would	not	“solve	the	traffic	issues,	only	harm	the	poorest	motorists,	those	with	children,	etc.”	
(Jørgensen,	2011).	This	letter	was	given	the	title	”Asocial	Payment	Ring”	and	opened	yet	
another	line	of	argument,	suggesting	that	those	who	could	pay	the	fee	would	just	continue	to	
drive	as	they	pleased,	meaning	that	the	payment	ring	would	impact	only	economically	
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vulnerable	people	–	and	thus	not	align	very	well	with	the	expected	stance	of	a	center-left	
government.	
 
These	letters	in	Politiken	in	January	2011	are	indicative	of	the	media	controversy	that	came	to	
surround	the	payment	ring	plans.	Some	people	worked	hard	to	publish	the	positive	
consequences	of	a	payment	ring,	while	others	worked	hard	to	publicize	the	negative	
consequences	of	a	payment	ring	–	and	what	was	at	stake	was	not	just	the	payment	ring,	but	
the	outcome	of	the	2011	elections.	Above	all,	reading	the	news	articles	and	the	commentary	
published	about	the	payment	ring	in	2011-2012	makes	clear	that	the	contours	of	the	payment	
ring	issue	are	not	stable	at	all.	On	the	contrary,	there	was	an	ongoing	proliferation	of	possible	
consequences	that	caused	concern	and	conflict,	something	which	activated	new	actors	and	
expanded	the	relevant	political	community	(Latour,	2003).	 
 
For	instance,	The	Danish	Road	Association,	a	corporate	lobby,	argued	that	in	many	cases,	it	
would	take	longer	for	people	to	get	to	work	using	public	transportation	than	by	using	their	
cars	(Rasmussen,	2012).	This	created	uncertainty	about	the	argument	that	reducing	
congestion	with	a	payment	ring	would	save	Denmark	money	overall,	because	more	people	
would	be	at	work	instead	of	in	transit.	This	again	made	it	much	harder	for	people	to	accept	
that	they	would	have	to	pay	to	use	their	cars.	The	argument	about	long	public	transportation	
times	was	met	with	counter-arguments,	including	the	idea	that	the	travel	times	had	been	
calculated	based	on	unfair	assumptions,	such	as	people	walking	to	the	train	station	instead	of	
riding	a	bike.	Another	counter-argument	was	that	the	calculations	of	travel	times	did	not	take	
into	account	the	positive	effects	of	the	public	transport	improvements	that	a	payment	ring	
would	finance.	This	last	argument	was	tied	to	the	larger	argument	about	whether	a	payment	
ring	should	be	understood	as	an	expense	or	as	a	source	of	income	for	the	Danish	economy.	 
 
When	these	concerns	and	arguments	were	published	and	circulated	by	the	news	media,	
multiple	relationships	between	the	payment	ring	and	a	variety	of	actors	proliferated.	
Following	Latour’s	(2003)	use	of	Dewey’s	(1927)	theory	of	the	public	as	consisting	of	those	
assembled	by	a	specific	problem,	these	relationships	can	be	understood	as	articulations	of	the	
various	indirect	consequences	that	could	be	associated	with	a	payment	ring.	Some	of	these	
actors	were	specific	groups	and	individuals,	such	as	“those	with	children”	and	“the	poorest	
motorists,”	as	argued	above.	Others	were	nonhuman	actors.	In	the	argument	just	referenced,	
not	just	cars,	but	also	bikes	and	trains,	became	part	of	the	issue,	as	did	several	organizations.	
When	critics	of	the	payment	ring	said	that	it	was	an	open	question	whether	the	Danish	
national	railway	service	(DSB)	could	carry	all	the	passengers	that	were	supposed	to	shift	from	
cars	to	public	transport,	it	activated	DSB	as	part	of	the	political	community	that	had	to	be	
consulted	on	the	issue	(Østergaard,	2011).	 
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Figure	1:	Map	showing	where	S-SF	eventually	proposed	to	construct	the	payment	ring	(Source:	Google	Maps	-	
https://goo.gl/zHgESE). 
 
As	these	payment	ring	associations	multiplied	in	the	news	media,	more	actors	were	
introduced	and	more	uncertainties	were	articulated	in	relation	to	the	consequences	of	
implementing	the	payment	ring	policy.	In	February	2012	the	prime	minister	decided	to	drop	
the	plans	altogether	rather	than	reconsider	how	to	carry	them	out.	Even	though	there	had	
been	consensus	among	experts	and	the	political	elite	that	a	payment	ring	was	both	needed	
and	realistic,	there	was	no	change	to	the	status	quo,	except	for	what	was	perceived	by	media	
pundits	as	a	humiliating	defeat	for	the	S-SF	coalition,	now	in	government.	In	their	view,	the	
media	controversy	was	an	example	of	“how	not	to	do	politics	well”,	as	the	political	
commentator	of	the	public	service	news	broadcaster	Danmarks	Radio	(DR)	put	it	(Ringberg,	
2012).		
	
Such	a	view	aligned	with	the	view	of	S-SF	politicians	who	in	hindsight	regretted	that	they	had	
not	planned	the	introduction	of	the	payment	ring	idea	better	so	as	not	to	provoke	media	
controversy.	As	the	politician	mentioned	earlier	told	me:	“Seen	in	retrospect,	it	was	a	grave	
mistake	that	the	issue	was	not	primed	much	better”	(Birkbak,	2016).	Priming	here	refers	to	
the	technique	of	foreshadowing	reactions,	for	instance	avoiding	to	name	something	a	
“payment”	ring	in	order	to	prevent	people	from	understanding	the	policy	as	yet	another	fee.	
	
Economic	assumptions	and	the	role	of	publics	
	
The	Latourian	perspective	offers	an	alternative	viewpoint,	which	does	not	only	make	the	
media	controversy	appear	as	less	of	a	surprise,	but	also	points	towards	a	way	of	rendering	it	
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politically	productive.	In	Latour’s	(1996)	conceptualization,	the	appearance	of	new	actors	and	
concerns	is	a	sign	that	a	socio-technical	innovation	is	happening.	The	stage	of	uncertainty	is	
unavoidable	because	it	can,	by	definition,	not	be	known	or	foreseen	what	new	actors	will	
appear.	Notions	such	as	political	priming	do	not	capture	this	feature	of	new	socio-technical	
infrastructures.		
	
Furthering	Latour’s	understanding	of	controversy	as	the	natural	state	of	affairs	when	new	
infrastructures	are	introduced,	Marres	(2005)	redescribes	the	democratic	public	as	always	
‘sparked	into	being’	by	new	objects,	such	as	the	payment	ring,	which	comes	with	unexpected	
consequences	that	reach	beyond	their	immediate	setting.	In	the	Copenhagen	case,	the	
proposal	to	introduce	congestion	charges	turned	out	to	implicate	a	wide	variety	of	settings,	
including	the	everyday	lives	of	families,	public	transport	solutions,	and	the	concerns	of	
businesses	relying	on	road	traffic	to	make	themselves	profitable.	Conceiving	of	these	
emergent	actors	and	concerns	as	a	public	assembled	by	an	issue	makes	it	possible	to	
appreciate	the	payment	ring	debacle	as	a	democratic	event	rather	than	a	controversy	that	less	
clumsy	politicians	would	have	avoided.		
	
Indeed,	from	a	perspective	of	democratic	politics,	where	citizens	are	expected	to	play	an	
active	role	in	decision-making,	it	can	appear	surprising	how	something	as	engaging	as	the	
payment	ring	controversy	could	come	to	be	understood	as	the	opposite	of	good	politics.	Barry	
(2002)	offers	a	distinction	between	politics	and	the	political,	where	politics	is	understood	as	
the	art	of	containing	dissent,	while	the	political	are	moments	that	overflow	the	existing	
frames	to	an	extent	where	the	political	can	no	longer	be	contained	by	politics.	The	political	
here	is	akin	to	situations	where	new	publics	are	sparked	into	being	by	specific	issues,	whereas	
politics	can	be	used	to	describe	how	policy	makers	try	to	prevent	this	from	happening.	
	
The	distinction	is	useful	for	pin-pointing	the	role	of	economic	assumptions	in	supressing	the	
political	potential	of	the	payment	ring	issue.	Specifically,	the	payment	ring	was	understood	in	
economic	terms	as	an	infrastructure	with	which	to	deal	with	some	of	the	externalities	related	
to	driving	–	e.g.	driving	around	as	one	pleases,	while	avoiding	the	problems	of	congestion.	The	
payment	ring	was	understood	as	a	solution	to	a	problem,	not	a	problem	in	itself,	which	again	
makes	the	public	controversy	unwanted	–	“how	not	to	do	politics”,	as	the	DR	journalist	put	it.	
 
In	this	view,	the	payment	ring	is	a	question	for	experts	and	elected	politicians	acting	on	a	
mandate	given	to	them	by	a	general	public	that	is	not	equipped	to	interfere	in	the	details	of	
complicated	policies	that	rest	on	economic	expertise.	It	is	noteworthy	how	this	also	positions	
the	role	of	publics	in	a	specific	way.	The	comments	made	by	the	(then)	prime	minister,	Helle	
Thorning-Schmidt,	when	she	defended	her	decision	to	drop	the	payment	ring	policy	are	
revealing	here.	She	gave	a	couple	of	explanations,	one	of	which	highlighted	the	role	played	by	
experts	and	their	calculations:	 
 
We	received	calculations	all	the	time,	which	showed	that	the	congestion	ring	
generated	a	smaller	income	than	we	would	have	liked.	But	things	take	time,	and	I	
am	glad	that	we	made	the	decision	[to	drop	it]	(Politiken,	2012).	 
 
This	conclusion	became	the	headline	of	a	Politiken	news	story.	In	its	explanation	of	the	
discontinuation	of	the	payment	ring	plan,	the	newspaper	said	that	the	proposed	method	for	
reducing	congestion	in	Copenhagen	was	not	desirable	after	all,	because	expert	bureaucrats	
had	told	the	government	that	the	solution	would	not	work	as	they	had	first	thought.	This	
explanation	focuses	on	economic	expertise	as	the	decisive	factor,	something	which	implies	a	
specific	role	for	the	public	in	democratic	politics	as	an	electorate	that	chooses	representatives	
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who	can	then	make	informed	decisions.	It	was	not	the	only	explanation	offered,	however.	
Three	days	earlier,	the	prime	minister	said	the	following	to	a	DR	journalist:	 
 
What	hit	the	nail	on	the	head	was	that	those	who	use	public	transportation	
suddenly	also	opposed	the	payment	ring,	even	though	they	were	the	ones	that	
would	benefit	from	it.	That	made	it	clear	to	me	that	it	was	not	just	the	motorists	
and	the	surrounding	municipalities,	but	broad	parts	of	the	population,	who	did	
not	find	it	a	good	idea	(Vester,	2012).		
 
In	this	statement,	the	prime	minister	implicitly	refers	to	the	alleged	complication	that	shifting	
large	amounts	of	commuters	from	cars	to	public	transportation	might	result	in	longer	travel	
times	for	those	using	public	transportation	(Rasmussen,	2012).	The	statement,	however,	can	
also	be	seen	as	a	realization	that	the	general	public	opinion	about	the	payment	ring	simply	
turned	around.	In	any	case,	what	is	noteworthy	about	this	statement	is	how	the	prime	
minister	emphasizes	something	other	than	expertise,	namely	the	role	played	by	“the	
population.”	Her	explanation	thus	expands	further	on	the	implied	role	of	the	public	in	politics.	
Groups	with	vested	interests,	in	this	case	the	motorists	and	those	living	close	to	the	planned	
payment	ring,	were	not	perceived	as	a	legitimate	source	of	political	agency.	The	leanings	of	
the	broader	population,	however,	could	be	a	decisive	factor	for	the	government,	especially	
because	some	of	these	people	were	against	a	policy	that	was	believed	to	benefit	them	
personally.	The	decisive	factor	of	payment	ring	politics	here	is	not	only	the	experts,	but	also	
signals	from	‘the	general	public’	as	long	as	it	is	cleansed	from	‘special	interest	groups’.	 
 
What	the	two	official	explanations	have	in	common	is	that	the	public	is	not	framed	as	
emerging	together	with	an	issue	(cf.	Marres,	2005).	Either	the	public	is	framed	as	leaving	
issues	to	experts	and	representatives	entirely	(explanation	1)	or	the	public	is	framed	as	only	
intervening	in	the	negative	sense	of	not	wanting	a	policy	even	though	it	would	benefit	from	it	
(explanation	2).	There	is	no	room	in	these	understandings	of	democratic	politics	for	those	
who	are	implicated	in	negative	ways	by	the	payment	ring,	as	the	last	quote	underlines.	In	both	
explanations,	economic	assumptions	play	a	key	role.	In	the	first,	economic	expertise	is	needed	
in	order	to	have	a	say	in	what	is	a	feasible	and	financially	responsible	policy.	In	the	second,	
members	of	the	public	are	conceived	as	individual	agents	that	are	expected	to	first	and	
foremost	follow	their	private	economic	interests.	
	
The	two	explanations	understand	the	payment	ring	project	as	either	an	always-already	good	
idea	or	an	always-already	bad	idea,	which	obscures	the	many	grey	zones	of	partial	benefit	and	
partial	harm	introduced	by	such	a	project.	For	instance,	one	letter	to	the	editor	in	Politiken	
expressed	the	dilemma	of	a	voter	who	was	normally	loyal	to	the	center-left	in	Danish	politics,	
and	was	willing	to	sacrifice	something	to	achieve	less	congestion	in	Copenhagen.	
Nevertheless,	the	voter	feared	that	her	car	repair	shop	would	go	bankrupt	because	of	its	
potentially	unfavorable	physical	location	right	outside	the	projected	payment	ring	(Ejlertsen,	
2011).	 
 
Such	complications	are	backgrounded	in	the	statements	of	Helle	Thorning-Schmidt.	Instead,	
the	official	explanations	understand	the	public	as	split	in	two.	The	first	public	consists	of	
people	with	concrete	transportation	needs,	which	means	that	each	individual	is	understood	to	
be	motivated	by	personal	interests.	It	follows	that	politicians	can	intervene	in	their	behavior	
by	implementing	a	tax.	It	also	follows	that	this	particular	public	must	be	expected	to	be	
difficult	to	convince	to	agree	to	such	a	policy,	since	those	with	cars	will	not	appreciate	having	
to	pay	a	fee	to	drive.	Because	the	first	public	can	be	understood	to	be	partisan	in	nature,	it	is	
not	a	legitimate	ground	for	democratic	decision	making.	Any	scheme	of	congestion	charges	
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“affords	the	citizen	rather	limited	political	agency”	(Huse,	2015:49),	but	in	this	case	the	notion	
of	acting	on	citizens	as	consumers	driven	by	individual	rationality	is	extended	to	how	
members	of	the	public	can	be	expected	to	participate	in	relation	to	a	public	issue. 
 
The	second	public	is	a	public	of	citizens	who	vote	in	elections.	It	is	possible	to	convince	this	
public	if	policies	like	the	payment	ring	are	made	part	of	larger	reform	packages	that	are	both	
progressive	and	financially	responsible.	The	second	public	is	not	partisan	in	nature,	
something	which	can	be	ensured	by	consulting	only	those	parts	of	the	populations	that	speak	
up	against	a	policy	“even	though	they	were	the	ones	that	would	benefit	from	it,”	as	the	prime	
minister	put	it.	If	a	protest	happens	despite	personal	interest,	it	is	understood	as	concerned	
with	the	common	good	and	thus	as	a	legitimate	force	in	democratic	politics.	 
	
Following	this	two-level	understanding	of	the	public,	the	payment	ring	proposal	worked	as	
expected.	The	motorists	got	angry,	but	overall,	the	citizens	voted	for	the	reform	package	by	
voting	the	S-SF	alliance	into	office.	In	fact,	it	might	seem	that	the	politicians	had	done	their	job	
quite	well,	not	only	in	terms	of	identifying	and	launching	a	device	for	reconfiguring	car-
human-relations	in	Copenhagen,	but	also	in	terms	of	finding	ways	to	relate	the	device	to	the	
public	through	a	successful	election	platform.	However,	when	the	payment	ring	did	not	stay	
within	the	frame	of	the	common	reform	program	crafted	by	experts	and	elected	
representatives,	the	politicians	behind	it	found	no	way	of	carrying	it	through	and	craft	a	
settlement	between	the	various	concerned	parties	(cf.	Latour,	1996).	Instead,	the	politicians	
stuck	to	an	understanding	of	the	public	based	on	economic	assumptions,	as	just	described,	
where	the	individuals	are	either	involved	as	rational	market	agents	(to	be	acted	on	with	levies	
and	fees)	or	not	thinking	about	personal	benefit	(to	be	appealed	to	through	financially	
responsible	reform	packages).		
	
As	such,	the	payment	ring	never	escaped	the	setting	of	economic	reforms	in	which	it	was	first	
conceived,	which	made	the	media	controversy	appear	as	a	negative	event.	Here,	the	payment	
ring	continued	to	be	treated	as	primarily	a	question	of	economics.	Top	right-wing	politicians	
campaigned	in	2011	with	claims	that	were	widely	publicised	in	the	news	media	that	living	
with	a	payment	ring	would	cost	inhabitants	in	Copenhagen	thousands	of	kroner	each	year,	
while	at	the	same	time	arguing	that	the	policy	would	only	serve	to	harm	the	economy	overall	
(e.g.	Jensen,	2011).	Even	if	the	payment	ring	could	be	seen	as	being	primarily	about	making	
Copenhagen	a	less	polluted	place	to	live,	it	was	never	treated	as	just	a	solution	to	
environmental	problems.	From	the	very	beginning,	the	payment	ring	was	also	part	of	a	policy	
of	financial	responsibility.	As	such,	it	was	not	treated	as	an	issue	that	could	implicate	people’s	
lives	in	unforeseen	and	potentially	antagonizing	ways,	but	as	part	of	a	reform	program	aimed	
at	the	Danish	population	in	general.		
	
Conclusion	
	
Latour	gave	his	book	about	the	failure	of	the	ARAMIS	transportation	system	an	alternative	
title:	“the	love	of	technology”	(Latour,	1996).	In	his	argument,	new	technological	solutions	
need	love	and	support	in	order	to	be	actualized	in	societies	that	must	always	be	expected	to	
be	complicated	and	changing.	The	story	about	ARAMIS	is	helpful	for	seeing	how	the	
Copenhagen	payment	ring	was	not	born	out	of	anything	resembling	love.	It	was	introduced	as	
just	a	small	part	of	a	complicated	package	of	economic	reforms	proposed	by	two	center-left	
parties	in	Danish	politics.	This	meant	that	the	payment	ring	was	first	and	foremost	conceived	
of	in	financial	terms.	Its	feasibility	was	based	on	economic	assumptions	about	the	individual	
economic	agency	of	motorists	in	Copenhagen.		
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The	ensuing	media	controversy	corrected	this	by	providing	abundant	evidence	that	the	
payment	ring	implicated	much	more	than	economic	modelling	expertise	and	the	assumed	
economic	rationalities	of	individual	citizens	in	the	Danish	capital.	Understood	as	an	issue,	
these	struggles	could	have	provided	directions	for	constructing	a	world	with	a	payment	ring,	
but	the	issue	was	pushed	aside	by	policy-makers	and	commentators,	not	willing	to	leave	
behind	the	economic	assumptions	that	first	shaped	the	policy.	The	original	motivation	of	
making	Copenhagen	a	“greener”	place	was	lost	to	financial	concerns	almost	from	the	
beginning	of	the	S-SF	alliance.	The	environmental	issues	never	made	it	back	to	the	center	
stage,	although	they	could	have	provided	an	alternative	frame.	The	defeat	of	the	“green”	
ambition	can	partly	be	explained	by	the	policy	regime	of	‘ecological	modernization’	where	
environmental	issues	are	acted	on	with	economics	(Blok,	2007),	but	also	points	to	how	such	a	
regime	can	stall	the	development	of	new	solutions.			
	
The	aim	of	this	article	has	been	to	show	how	concerns	with	state	finances,	and	the	implicit	
and	explicit	economic	assumptions	that	come	with	such	concerns,	create	a	politics	that	are	
adverse	to	the	unfolding	of	new	sociotechnical	solutions	as	issues,	something	that	their	
realization	might	very	well	require.	An	important	part	of	the	argument	was	that	it	is	not	just	a	
question	of	democratic	politics	or	not,	but	a	question	of	what	kind	of	democratic	politics,	
specifically	whether	the	public	is	split	in	two	levels	based	on	economic	assumptions,	or	
understood	as	emerging	together	with	issues.	
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